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I. INTRODUCTION
Whether in response to recently experienced shortages in our do-
mestic mineral and energy resources, or simply in recognition of the
steadily increasing demand for such materials, interest in develop-
ment of the considerable resources on Indian reservations seems to
have undergone a renaissance. A wide range of obstacles and un-
certainties-such as successful location of minerals in commercial
grades and quantities, identification of supportive long-term markets,
and access to economic transportation services, to name a few-are
common and inescapable features of all mineral activities. But when
such operations are conducted on Indian reservations, operators are
exposed to additional and serious uncertainties about the extent to
which a wide and seemingly ever increasing range of state and local
statutes and ordinances relating generally to mineral operations will
be applicable to on-reservation operations. Such statutes, which often
conflict with or are duplicative of federal or tribal requirements, ex-
pose operators to additional expense, delays and other frustrations
and uncertainties, whether the operators elect to comply or not with
the state statutes.'
Reconciliation of such conflicts or eliminiation of duplication is
often difficult, principally because the legal status and nature of In-
dian tribes and their reservations and their unique relationship to
federal, state, and local governments is exceedingly complex.2 In
part that complexity reflects the fact that the nature of the relation-
ship between Indians and state and federal governments is depen-
dent upon treaties and statutes, generally uncodified, which often
have application only to particular Indian tribes or reservations. In
part the complexity results from the many historical shifts in the
general policies of the United States toward Indians and Indian
tribes.3
1. The uncertainties associated with noncompliance include, at a minimum, exposure
to litigation by the state to enforce compliance, and the related risks of judicial suspension
of operations pending resolution of potentially protracted litigation. Alternatively, election
by the operator to comply with a state statute, even where no outright conflicts with fed-
eral or tribal directives are involved, may involves considerable additional expense or delay,
especially where issuance of a permit or authorization after public or other hearings is
involved. Of equal significance, such a decision may be contrary to the wishes of the In-
dian tribe itself, which is often in the position of resisting a variety of state and local
efforts to exercise jurisdiction on the reservation, and may have a detrimental effect on
the working relationship between the tribe and the mineral operator.
2. The extent of state jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations has been described
as the murkiest question of all. Chambers, "Fetieral Environmental Regulation of Minerals
Resources Development with Particular Emphasis on Indian Lands," Western Coal Develop-
ment Institute, Rocky Mountain Mineral Late Foundation 35 (1973).
S. Compare Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) and McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 171 (1973). The early attitude, persisting
through 1871, was to deal with Indian tribes as separate nations through treaties. Then,
as evidenced by the General Allotment Act of 1887 (Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388)
a policy of distribution of the lands in Indian reservations to individual Indians and the
assimilation of Indians into society was begun and followed (with the resultant loss of a
substantial portion of the Indian land base) until the major change in policy signaled by
NON-INDIAN MINERAL ACTIVITIES
The uncertainties which result from that complexity are com-
pounded when questions relating to mineral activities are involved.
Although there is an enormous mass of material dealing generally
with Indian tribes and their relationships with state and local govern-
ments 4  few authorities or commentators deal specifically with
mineral matters.5
And yet, the available authorities, even though not specifically
applicable to minerals, do provide a basis for formulating a test or
generalized analytical tool by which the extent of state or local juris-
diction over non-Indian activities on an Indian reservation can be
measured on a case by case basis. And, with appropriate additional
consideration of particular treaties or statutes dealing with a Tribe's
mineral rights and of federal statutes of general application to Indian
mineral matters, such test ought to be equally effective as a device
for measuring state jurisdiction over non-Indian mineral activities on
Indian reservations. Formulation of such a test and consideration of
treaties, statutes, and regulations having particular application to
such mineral activities is the objective of this investigation.
II. THE NATURE OF INDIAN TRIBES AND RESERVATIONS
The unique nature of Indian tribes 6 makes a brief review of their
essential characteristics and of the nature of federal power over
them an essential ingredient in this inquiry.
A.. INDIANS AND INDIAN TRIBES
Indians preceded European settlers in their dominion and control
over the lands now comprising the United States. Their aboriginal
rights in the lands by reason of such presence was acknowledged by
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, ch. 576,
48 Stat. 984, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, et seq. (1970). That enactment, providing me-
chanisms for organization and self-government by Indian tribes, reflected a federal policy
of encouragement and preservation of the Indian tribes as entities. Later enactments Illu-
strate the continuing conflicts in Congress between those favoring preservation and en-
hancement of Indian tribes as separate cultures and those favoring termination of tribes
as separate entities and assimilation of individual Indians into the main stream of society.
4. Monroe Price's pioneering casebook on Indian Law studies characterizes it as a
"mountain of material." Price, Law and The American Indian vii-viii (1973). The quantity
is reflective of the fact that the issues have frequently recurred throughout the Nation's
history.
5. Notable exceptions are the excellent article by Reid Chambers, identified in note 2,
supra, and the presentation by Messrs. Berger and Mounce at the Sixteenth Mineral Law
Institute. Berger and Mounce, "Applicability of State Conservation and Other Laws to
Indian and Public Lands," 16 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 347 (1971). Judicial decisions In-
volving state jurisdiction over mineral matters, as reviewed below, have been few in num-
ber and generally superficial in their analysis.
6. This unique status has been characterized as long standing in nature and founded
upon diverse sources; but of sufficient substance, for example, to justify special federal
hiring practices for Indians (see 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970)) notwithstanding the prohibitions
against racial discrimination in federal hiring in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. 1973) and of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
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our courts from the earliest dates of the nation.7 Such rights were
those of occupancy rather than in fee simple,8 and were subject to
the superior rights of the discovering or conquering nation,9 although
enforceable against parties other than the United States.10 Defini-
tion of the scope and extent of such rights by the discovering power
has been described as a political matter,:1 and modification or ex-
tinguishment of such rights, (as opposed to rights which have been
recognized by treaty or statute) violates no precept of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution against taking of pri-
vate property without compensation .12
The federal government has plenary power over Indians and In-
dian tribes"3 based on the commerce clause 4  (the only grant of
power in the Federal Constitution which mentions Indians), the treaty
power,'15 and the power to control the property of the United States,1 6
among others, contained in the United States Constitution.1
In Worcester v. Georgia,1 sometimes called the "primordial" de-
cision in Indian affairs, Chief Justice Marshall confirmed the special
sovereign status of Indian tribes and the plenary authority of the
United States over them, stating:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupy-
ing its own territory, with boundaries accurately described,
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, in which
the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the
assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with
treaties and with the acts of congress. 9
Consistent with such conclusions, tribes are recognized to be unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory. 20
7. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835).
8. See generally the discussion in United States Department of Interior, Federal Indian
Law, 18-21, 593-601 (1958) (hereinafter Federal Indian Law).
9. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
10. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). See also United States
v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
11 . Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
12. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
13. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194 (1975).
14. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3 of the United States Constitution grants to Congress the power
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."
15. U.S. Const., Art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
16. U.S. Const., Art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2.
17. See generally Federal Indian Law 21-91. The United States Supreme Court recently
acknowledged the confusion over the precise sources of federal authority, but concluded
that "it Is now generally recognized that the power derives from federal responsibility for
regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making." McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 172 note 7 (1973).
18. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
19. Id. at 561.
20. For contemporary recognition of such status see United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544 (1975).
NON-INDIAN MINERAL AcTIVmS
Although recognized as sovereign in many respects and gener-
ally intended by treaty to be left free to govern their tribal affairs
within their designated reservations, cultural differences between
European settlers and Indians, differences in property concepts,
and sheer population pressures from non-Indians soon made it ap-
parent that the Indians were ill equipped to protect the rights granted
to them by treaties. 21 Eloquent recognition of the plight of the In-
dians and of the special responsibilities of the United States toward
them-a relationship described as being like that of guardian and
ward-was articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Kagama as follows:
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent
largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive
from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helpless-
ness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal
Government with them, and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and
by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has
arisen.
The power of the General Government over these remnants
of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in num-
bers, is necessary for their protection, as well as to the
safety of those among whom they dwell. 22
Recognition of the Indians' condition and of their educational
and cultural differences lead the courts to the conclusion that In-
dian treaties and statutes ratifying agreements with the Indians can-
not be read as ordinary contracts agreed upon by parties dealing
at arm's length and with equal bargaining positions. 2 In response
the courts adopted a canon of construction for such treaties and sta-
tutes to the effect that "doubtful expressions, instead of being re-
solved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor of
a weak and defenseless people, who are wards of the nation, and
dependent upon its protection and good faith. ' 24
21. See, for example, Comment, "The Indian Battle for Self-Determination," 58 Cal. L.
Riv. 445 (1970).
22. 118 U.S. 875, 383-84 (1886).
23. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
24. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912) ; Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 867
(1930). See Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 101-2 (1899), for an early, and perhaps the best
statement of the rule. See also Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975), for a clear
reaffirmation of its current vitality.
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B. INDIAN RESERVATIONS
As noted, many treaties or agreements designated specific geo-
graphical areas for use of Indian tribes, with the precise delineation
of the boundaries of such areas a major part of early government
policy in Indian affairs as a means of securing peace between Indians
and non-Indians.25 While a few of such treaties granted a fee sim-
ple interest to the Indian tribe, 26 more commonly the treaties merely
memorialized the fact of tong standing Indian occupancy of the
area.2 7 Differing from aboriginal rights, rights recognized or con-
firmed by treaty were accorded the full range of Fifth Amendment
protections .28
Lands located in such Indian reservations occupy a special sta-
tus in many respects. They are no longer part of the public domain,
and laws and regulations applying generally to the public domain
are not applicable to lands in Indian reservations:,29 unless the in-
tent that they so apply is clearly shown.3 0 Within such areas, except
to the extent limited by treaty, and subject to the plenary power
of the United States, Indian tribes are free to govern themselves.2 '
The analytical basis for such authority is succinctly summarized
in Federal Indian Law:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of In-
dian tribal powers is marked by adherence to three funda-
mental principles: (1) An Indian tribe possessed, in the first
instance, all the powers of any sovereign State. (2) Conquest
rendered the tribe subject to the legislative power of the
United States and, in substance, terminated the external pow-
ers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into
treaties with foreign nations, but did not by itself terminate
the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of lo-
cal self-government. (3) These internal powers were, of
25. Federal Indian Law, note 8 supra at 643.
26. See Treaty with the Creek Indians, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 417 at Article 3: "The
United States will grant a patent, in fee simple, to the Creek nation of Indians for the
land assigned said nation by this treaty or convention ... "
27. Treaty with Sac and Fox Indians, Nov. 3, 1804, 7 Stat. 84, at Article 7 provides, for
example: "As long as the lands which are now ceded to the United States remain their[the United States'] property, the Indians belonging to the said tribes, shall enjoy the
privilege of living and hunting upon them." [Parenthetical added]. See also Treaty with
the Menominee Indians, May 12, 1854, 10 Stat. 1064, 1065.
28. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955); United States v. Sho-
shone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111 (1938).
29. 34 Op. Atty. Gen. 181 (1924).
30. See, for example, Section 701 of the recently vetoed Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1975 which expressly provided for application of certain provisions of
the Act to "Indian lands." H.R. 25, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
31. In United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975), the Supreme Court recapitu-
lated its previous decisions recognizing this authority, stating: ". . . Indian tribes are
unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their
territory, Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 557 (1832); they are 'a separate people' pos-
sessing the 'power of regulating their internal and social relations. . . .' United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-382 (1886); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411
U.S. 164, 173 (1973)."
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course, subject to qualification by treaties and by express
legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly qualified,
many powers of internal sovereignty have remained in the
Indian tribes and in their duly constituted organs of govern-
ment.3
2
The reservations created by treaty were frequently reduced in
area by subsequent treaties, agreements, or statutes by which lands
were ceded by the tribe to the United States in exchange for cash
payments or promises of various kinds of assistance.3 3 Such ces-
sions generally resulted in an intact, although diminished area re-
served for the tribe with respect to which the tribe's authority re-
mained unchanged.
The United States has defined all lands within the limits of any
Indian reservation, among others, as "Indian country ' 3 4 and utilizes
that definition for a variety of purposes235 Since it is clear that the
United States has the authority unilaterally to terminate the status
of any lands as Indian reservations, 36 questions often arise under
statutes utililzing the "Indian country" definition about whether
later action by the United States has operated to effect such termina-
tion.
For example, the Dawes Act, 37 enacted in 1887 in an attempt
to reconcile the government's responsibility for the Indians' welfare
and the desire of non-Indians to settle on reservation lands, resulted
in non-Indian ownership of substantial tracts of land within areas
set aside as Indian reservations." It has been established as a gen-
eral rule that once a showing is made that Congress has created a
82. Federal Insdian Law 398.
33. The history of the Crow Indian Reservation provides one of the most startling
examples of the extent to which reservations were reduced in area by such cessions. The
initial treaty with the Crow Tribe did not limit or define the Tribe's territory, although it
recognized its existence. (Crow Treaty of Aug. 4, 1825, 7 Stat. 266). In 1851, however, a
reservation for the Crow, Sioux and other tribes was delineated by treaty and encom-
passed approximately 38 million acres. Subsequent treaties and statutes providing for ces-
sion of lands reduced the portion of the initial reservation allocated to the Crow Tribe to
an area of approximately 1.5 million acres. (Treaty of May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649; Act of
April 11, 1882, 22 Stat. 42; Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 989 ; Act of April 27, 1904,
Pub. L. No. 58-183, 83 Stat. 352; Act of August 31, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-410, 50 Stat.
884).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1970).
85. See, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 1154 (1970) pertaining to control of liquor within
such areas; 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970) relating to exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain
criminal offenses committed there; and 25 U.S C. §§ 1321, 1322 (1970) dealing with acqui-
sition by States of criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indians in such areas.
36. See, for example, DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). How-
ever, a Congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights is not lightly imputed to Congress.
See Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968).
37. Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. The act was entitled The General
Allotment Act of 1887 and authorized the President to allot portions of tribal lands to the
individual Indians and, with the approval of the tribe, to sell the balance of the various
reservations to non-Indian settlers, with the proceeds of sale dedicated to the Indian's
benefit.
38. For example over half of the land within the Flathead Indian Reservation is owned
by non-Indians, and Indians comprise only nineteen percent of the total population within
the reservation boundaries. See Security State Bank v. Pierre, 162 Mont. 298, 511 P.2d
325 (1973).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
reservation, all areas included within the defined boundaries remain
a part of the reservation until a Congressional intent to terminate
reservation status with respect to the tract involved is shown.3 9 Such
intent must be expressed on the face of the act or be clear from the
surrounding circumstances and legislative history,40 another canon
of construction which may reflect the courts' awareness of the special
responsibilities of the United States to Indians. Opening reservation
areas for non-Indian settlement pursuant to the Dawes Act has
been held not to show a Congressional intent to terminate the reser-
vation status of lands affected 4 1 nor did permission for white settle-
ment under other acts following the pattern of the Dawes Act but
applying only to individual reservations have such effect.4 2 In pro-
per circumstances, however, a Congressional intent to terminate a
reservation can be shown notwithstanding absence of express lan-
guage to that effect in the statute.4 3
In summary, Indian tribes have sovereign rights, subject to the
plenary powers of the United States. Reservations, which are terri-
torial areas defined by treaty or statute, are the locations within
which tribes are entitled to exercise their sovereignty. Such areas
may contain substantial non-Indian ownership and yet retain their
reservation status. Such reservations are therefore the areas within
which federal, state, and tribal exercise of governmental authority
over mineral activities results in the conflicts which this investigation
seeks to resolve.
III. STATE JURISDICTION OVER NON-INDIANS ON RESERVA-
TIONS-THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS
Supreme Court decisions involving the extent of state jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians on Indian reservations, or otherwise having a
bearing on that question, are surprisingly few in number. Equally
surprising is the extent to which the Court has reached essentially
consistent conclusions on the scope of such state jurisdiction despite
the fact that the decisions span a period of almost one hundred and
fifty years and the fact that the cases consider exceedingly diverse
fact situations.
89. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 285 (1909).
40. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). See also United States ex rel. Con-
don v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973).
41. United States v. Nice, 241 U S. 591 (1916).
42. See, for example, Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), interpreting the effect of
the Act of June 17, 1892, 27 Stat. 52, on the Kiamath River Reservation; and Seymour
v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), concerning the effect of the Act of March 22,
1906, 34 Stat.,80, on the Colville Indian Reservation.
43. See DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), holding the Act of
March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1035, providing for allotment of reservation lands, effected termi-
nation of the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in view of the history of negotiations of
the Agreement with the Indians, and the legislative history of the Act ratifying it.
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A. EARLY DECISIONS
The investigation here too begins with Chief Justice Marshall's
analysis in Worcester v. Georgia,4 4 which involved the attempts of
the State of Georgia to require certain missionaries, residing within
the Cherokee reservation as permitted by federal law and pursuant
to federal licenses, to comply with state laws forbidding residence
by non-Indians on the reservation without a license from the state.
The missionaries' criminal conviction in a state court for failure to
have a state license was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, and was reversed on the basis that the Cherokee Nation en-
joyed sovereign status insofar as individual states were concerned,
which status had been recognized by the Indians' treaties with the
United States. Within the territorial confines of the Cherokee Reserva-
tion the state's laws were without effect.4 5
Virtually all of the modem Supreme Court decisions involving
questions of state jurisdiction have recognized and relied upon Wor-
cester v. Georgia as the point of beginning for resolution of the is-
sues, regardless-of the type of state jurisdictional exercise under
consideration.. Curiously, however, most of the older decisions ig-
nored it and did not include it in their analysis.
In 1882 the Supreme Court, in United States v. McBratney,
was asked to consider whether or not the conviction in federal court
of one non-Indian for the murder of another non-Indian on the Ute
Reservation was proper, or whether jurisdiction was properly in the
Colorado State courts,46 there being a federal statute granting to the
federal courts jurisdiction over such crimes only if the state courts
lacked such jurisdiction. The Court did not focus on the sovereign
status of the Indian tribe, because an 1861 Congressional Act estab-
lishing a temporary government for Colorado territory 7 granted
such government jurisdiction over all areas within the territory ex-
cept areas included in Indian reservations by treaty. The Ute Re-
servation was not created until 1868,48 seven years later. The sub-
sequent statehood enabling act did not contain the express dis-
claimer of jurisdiction language common to later enabling acts, and
was interpreted as not excepting state jurisdiction over the Ute Re-
servation, in view of the authority granted in the initial territorial
act. McBratney has been relied upon in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, particularly those involving criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, but the later cases have failed to focus on the peculiar fact
in McBratney that creation of the Colorado Territory preceded crea-
44. S1 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
45. See 4d. at 561.
46. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
47. Act of February 28, 1861, ch. 70, 12 Stat. 172.
48. Treaty of March 2, 1868, 15 Stat. 619.
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tion of the Indian Reservation. None of the later cases which rely so
heavily on McBratney involved such facts.
In Utah & Northern Ry. Co. v. Fisher"9 the Court was asked
to determine whether or not the Territory of Idaho could properly
impose a property tax upon that portion of the railroad's property
located on the Fort Hill Indian Reservation. The Court held that the
tax was properly imposed on the non-Indian entity, stating that the
authority of the Territory extended to all matters not interfering
with the protection of the Indians which were agreed to by the
United States in its treaties. For the first time, the Court Consid-
ered the extent to which imposition of state jurisdiction would consti-
tute an impairment of any of the rights guaranteed to the Indians
under their treaties with the United States. The case did not involve
any federal enactments other than such treaties. On the facts, the
Court concluded that no such interference would occur and upheld
the right of the Territory to impose the tax."0
The Supreme Court was again called upon in 1896 to consider the
extent of a state's criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on re-
servations within the state. In Draper v. United States,5 as in
McBratney, a federal conviction of one non-Indian for the murder
of another non-Indian on the reservation would have been improper
if the state courts had jurisdiction over the offense. In Draper, how-
ever, the state's Enabling Act contained an express disclaimer of
jurisdiction:
Second. That the people inhabiting the said proposed States
[including Montana] do . . . forever disclaim all right and
title . . . to all lands lying within said limits [of the state]
owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribes . . . and said
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and
control of the Congress of the United States. 52 [Paren-
thetical material added.]
Notwithstanding the fact that no statute granting full territorial juris-
diction preceded the treaty creating the reservation, as was, the
case in McBratney, the Supreme Court concluded that the decision
in McBratney was controlling unless the foregoing language in Mon-
tana's Enabling Act required a different result. The Court interpreted
the language in the Enabling Act in light of the General Allotment
49. 116 U.S. 28 (1885)
50. Although the Court's form of analysis was thoughtful, and the apparent forerunner
of later decisions, the strength of the holding is undercut by the fact noted in the opinion
that the lands upon which the railroad was located were ceded by the Tribe to the United
States for a cash payment. At least arguably, upon such cession, the lands ceased to be a
part of the reservation. This factual support for the holding was not noted in later cases
until Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 73,
note 2 (1962). See also Maricopa & Phoenix R.R. v. Arizona Territory, 156 U.S. 347 (1895).
51. 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
52. Act of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676.
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Act of 1887, 53 enacted two years previously, which in its view pro-
vided for "the gradual extinction of Indian reservations and Indian
titles by the allotment of such lands to the Indians in severalty.'
As indicated above, the Act provided for allotment of a portion of
reservation lands to individual Indians (subject to limitations ad-
ministered by the United States for a period of years on the Indians'
right to sell or encumber such lands) and for sale of the balance of
the reservation lands to non-Indians. In light of such scheme, con-
sidered by the Court to provide for termination of the reservations,
the Court concluded that the language in the Enabling Act was only
intended to allow the United States to continue its administrative
powers over lands alloted to individual Indians after such lands be-
came subject to state jurisdiction upon termination of the reservation.
The Court therefore held that Montana's courts did have jurisdiction
over the crime, even though it was committed on the reservation.
In light of the later indications of Congressional intent to preserve
Indian tribes and reservations1 5 and the decisions of the Supreme
Court holding that the General Allotment Act did not reflect a Con-
gressional intent to terminate reservations, 56 and considering the
fact that the Court entirely failed to discuss the tribal sovereignty
principles noted in Worcester v. Georgia, the Court's decision in
Draper must now be regarded as subject to serious question and as
having doubtful precedential value.
In Thomas v. Gay,5 7 the Court was asked to consider the au-
thority of the Territory of Oklahoma to tax cattle owned by non-
Indian lessees and maintained on the Osage and Kansas Indian
reservation in Oklahoma pursuant to teases granted by the tribal
government and approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The
court's attention was directed to the language of the territorial or-
ganic act providing that nothing in the act was to be construed (i)
to impair any rights of Indians or Indian tribes in the territory
pursuant to laws, agreements, and treaties of the United States; or,
(ii) to impair the personal property of the Indians; or, (iii) to affect
the authority of the government of the United States to make
laws or regulations relating to the Indians and their property. No
other federal enactment was involved in the case. The Court, citing
the Utah & Northern Railroad case reviewed above, distinguished
between the imposition of tax on the Indians themselves or upon
their property and a tax imposed upon properties in which they had
no interest. Apparently recognizing the inadequacy of that distinc-
53. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
54. 164 U.S. at 246.
55. Such intent is clearly reflected in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Act of
June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-576, 48 Stat. 984, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, et seq. (1970).
56. See the cases cited at notes 41 and 42, supra and related text.
57. 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
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tion as the sole basis for its decision, however, it further considered
whether or not such tax nevertheless would constitute an impair-
ment of the rights of the Indians contrary to the provisions of
the organic act. In applying that analysis it utilized the approach
suggested in its Utah & Northern Railroad decision. The Court con-
cluded that the tax would not constitute such an impairment, noting
that the tax was "too remote and indirect to be deemed a tax upon
the lands or privileges of the Indians."58 The court utilized ana-
logous cases evaluating the impact of state taxes on interstate com-
merce to support its conclusion and the propriety of that method of
analysis.
The individuals objecting to the tax also contended that imposi-
tion of the tax constituted an infringement by the territory upon fed-
eral jurisdiction and on the power of Congress to regulate commerce
with the Indian tribes. In response to that contention, the Court dis-
tinguished between the issue of state jurisdiction over Indians them-
selves, and its jurisdiction over non-Indians acting on reservations
in holding:
The unlimited power of Congress to deal with the Indians,
their property and commercial transactions, so long as they
keep up their tribal organizations, may be conceded; but it
is not perceived that local taxation, by a state or territory,
of property of others than Indians would be an interference
with Congressional power.59
In conclusion, the Court noted:
The taxes in question here were not imposed on the busi-
ness of grazing, or on the rents received by the Indians, but
on the cattle as: property of the lessees, and as we have here-
tofore said that such a tax is too remote and indirect to be
deemed a tax or burden on interstate commerce, so is it too
remote and indirect to be regarded as an interference with
the legislative power of Congress.6"
In New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin,," the Supreme Court con-
cluded that the State of New York had jurisdiction to punish the
murder of one non-Indian by another on the Salamanca Indian re-
servation, following McBratney, and citing it as controlling and as
establishing the proposition that "in the absence of a limiting treaty
obligation or Congressional enactment each state had a right to exer-
cise jurisdiction over Indian reservations within its boundaries." 62 The
58. Id. at 273.
59. Id. at 274-275.
60. Id. at 275. See also Truscott v. Hurlbut Land & -Cattle Co., 73 F. 60 (9th Cir. 1896),
upholding a similar tax on cattle on the Crow Reservation in Montana.
61. 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
62. Id. at 499.
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court expressly noted the fact that the treaty establishing the reserva-
tion68 contained no provision which would be violated by the state's
exercise of such jurisdiction in a situation which did not directly
affect the Indians."
In 1949, after a long series of decisions which continued the fed-
eral instrumentality theory as the basis for prohibiting imposition of
state taxes on the activities of non-Indian mineral lessees on Indian
reservations 65 the Court held that nondiscriminatory taxes could be
imposed on such lessees. eO The lands in question had been allotted
to individual Indians pursuant to the General Allotment Act,6 7 and
although the opinion does not so state, were presumably located with-
in the boundaries of various Indian reservations.
B. MODERN DECISIONS
1. Williams v. Lee
The Supreme Court rendered its first, and probably still its most
important modern decision on the issue in 1959.68 In Williams v. Lee
the Court concluded that an Arizona state court did not have juris-
diction over a civil suit brought by a non-Indian operating a store on
the reservation to recover amounts due on credit sales made to Nav-
ajo Indians on the reservation. Thus, in summary, the case involved
reservation Indians and on-reservation activities of a non-Indian.
The Court returned to Worcester v. Georgia and confirmed the
continuing vitality of the basic policies enunciated there; namely fed-
eral plenary power and tribal sovereignty. 69 The Court summarized
a number of its decisions since Worcester, including several of the
cases reviewed above, and conceded that the Court had modified the
Worcester principles "in cases where essential tribal relations were
not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardiz-
ed.... .- 7o By way of example, the Court noted that suits by Indians
against non-Indians in state courts had been authorized and state
courts had been allowed to try non-Indians for crimes committed
against other non-Indians on reservations. 7' The Court also pointed
out the fact that Congress has "acted consistently upon the assump-
tion that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians
on a reservation, 7 2 noting:
63. Treaty of November 11, 1794, 7 Stat. 44.
64. 326 U.S. at 500-501.
65. See Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U.S. 503 (1918); Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248
U.S. 549 (1919); Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922); and Oklahoma ex rol. Okla-
homa Tax Commission v. Barnsdall Refineries, 296 U.S. 521 (1936).
66. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949).
67. Id. at 343-344.
68. Williams v. Lee, 958 U.S. 217 (1959).
69. Id. at 218-220.
70. Id. at 219.
71. Id. at 220.
72. Id. at 220.
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Significantly, when Congress has wished the States to exercise
this power it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction
which Worcester v. Georgia had denied.73
The Court concluded that the holdings in the indicated cases and
the general principles of Worcester were in harmony and stated for
the first time what seems to be the fundamental approach by which
the extent of state jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservations is to
be measured:
Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them. 74
Because the treaty establishing the Navajo Reservation 75 set such
area apart as a permanent home for the Tribe and provided that
none except United States government personnel could enter without
tribal permission, the Court found it implicit that control of tribal af-
fairs is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the tribal government.
In view of such jurisdiction, and the resulting creation and operation
of a comprehensive tribal court system with jurisdiction broad e-
nough to deal with the controversy, the Court held:
[T]o alfow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would un-
dermine the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation
affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the Indians
to govern themselves.7 6
2. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan
The analytical approach enunciated in Williams seems clear
enough 7 7 if potentially difficult to apply in individual fact situations.
But in Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,75 a 1962 decision not in-
volving an Indian reservation, Justice Frankfurter sowed the seeds
of confusion. After summarizing the Court's previous decisions in
Thomas v. Gay,7 9 New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin," and Williams
v. Lee,81 all cases involving state jurisdiction over non-Indians on
reservations, the opinion offered the following unfortunate dicta:8 2
73. Id. at 221, n.6. As examples the Court cites various federal statutes granting broad
criminal and civil jurisdiction to New York, other statutes granting such jurisdiction to
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin and statutes granting such juris-
diction to Oklahoma.
74. Id. at 220.
75. Treaty of June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667.
76. William v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
77. But see, Note, "Indian Law-Taxation-Reservation Indian's Income not Taxable if
Derived from Reservation Sources--State Power over Reservation Indians is Limited," 22
Kan. L. Rev. 470 (1974), alleging lack of "conceptual clarity" in the decision.
78. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
79. 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
80. 326 U.S. 496 (1946).
81. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
82. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 176, note 15 (1973).
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These decisions indicate that even on reservations state laws
may be applied to Indians unless such application would inter-
fere with reservation self-government or impair a right grant-
ed or reserved by federal law.83
The import of the language was the seeming abandonment of con-
cepts of Indian sovereignty on reservations and limited state jur-
isdiction as a beginning point of analysis, and substitution of a vir-
tual presumption of state jurisdiction unless its exercise would inter-
fere with Indian self-government or impair a right granted or re-
served by federal law.
The lower courts were understandably confused by the meaning
of Kake and its relationship to the Supreme Court's holdings in Wil-
liams and Worcester. Some courts; used the Williams analysis, as re-
flected in Kake, to expand state court jurisdiction. 4 Such decisions
relied on the dicta in Kake to focus on whether or not the subject mat-
ter of the state action infringed on tribal self-government or was sub-
ject to a controlling federal law, rather than giving consideration to
whether or not the activity occurred within the territorial limits of a
reservation and to concepts of tribal sovereignty.
Other courts limited their jurisdiction over Indians on the gen-
eral basis that exercise of jurisdiction over on-reservation activity
would infringe on tribal self-government. 85
3. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission
The Supreme Court eliminated the basis for confusion and elab-
orated on the Williams approach in three decisions following Kake.8 s
In Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission7 the Court
was asked to consider whether or not Arizona could levy its sales tax
on a non-Indian retail trading business conducted on the Navajo Re-
servation with reservation Indians. The trader was licensed and re-
gulated by the United States under a variety of statutes, including an
1816 enactment giving the Commissioner of Indian Affairs the "sole
power and authority to appoint traders to the Indian tribes" and to
specify "the kind and quantity of goods and the prices at which such
goods shall be sold to the Indians." ' s After reviewing the provisions
88. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).
84. See State ex rel. Iron Bear v. District Court, 512 P.2d 1292 (Mont., 1973) ; Natewa
v. Natewa, 84 N.M. 69, 499 P.2d 691 (1972) ; McClanahan v. State -Tax Commission, 14
Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221 (1971).
85. See Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970).
86. Although the cases reflecting such seeming confusion deal with Indians themselves,
the dicta in Kake would have equal impact on non-Indian activities on reservations since
any limitations on state jurisdiction over non-Indians would be dependent upon protected
rights of the Indians themselves.
87. 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
88. Act of Aug. 15, 1876, § 6, 19 Stat. 200, 25 U.S.C. § 261 (1970).
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of the detailed regulations promulgated under such statutes, the Court
held:
These apparently all-inclusive regulations and the statutes
authorizing them would seem in themselves sufficient to show
that Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on re-
servations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws
imposing additional burdens on traders.8 9
And further:
We think the assessment and collection of this tax would to a
substantial extent frustrate the evident congressional purpose
of ensuring that no burden shall be imposed on Indian traders
for trading with Indians on reservations except as authorized
by Acts of Congress or by valid regulations promulgated un-
der those Acts.90
In relation to the Williams v. Lee analysis, the decision deals with
the first portion, and confirms that governing acts of Congress are
controlling on the states, even if such acts impose control by impli-
cation rather than express language.
4. Kennerly v. District Court
The Court again considered the governing acts of Congress por-
tion of the Williams test in Kennerly v. District Court,91 a 1971 opin-
ion concerning application of two federal acts dealing with state jur-
isdiction by express language, rather than by implication as in War-
ren Trading Post. Pursuant to a 1953 federal statute 2 states were
granted or authorized to acquire civil and criminal jurisdiction in
suits involving matters occurring on Indian reservations within their
boundaries. However, states desiring to acquire such jurisdiction were
required to take "affirmative legislative action ' 93 to effect such ac-
quisition. Montana took no legislative action to assume civil jurisdic-
tion over the Flathead Indian Reservation, although in 1967 the Black-
feet Tribal Council adopted a resolution providing that Montana State
and Blackfeet Tribal courts would have concurrent and not exclusive
jurisdiction over suits involving Tribal members and on-reservation
matters. The 1953 Act was amended by Title IV of the Civil Rights
89. 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965).
90. Id. 690-91. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
91. 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
92. Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588.
93. Id. Section 7. "The consent of the United States is hereby given to any other State
not having jurisdiction with respect to criminal offenses or civil causes of action, or with
respect to both, as provided for in this Act, to assume jurisdiction at such time and in
such manner as the people of the State shall, by affirmative action, obligate and bind
the State to assumption thereof."
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Act of 1968,94 deleting the requirement for "affirmative legislative
action" but requiring, as a condition to the state's assumption of jur-
isdiction, the consent of the Indian tribe by majority vote of adult
Indians voting at a special election held for the purpose. 5
Subsequent to the 1968 Act a non-Indian store owner of the reser-
vation brought an action in state court against certain reservation
Indians to recover the purchase price of items sold to the Indians.
The Montana Supreme Court upheld the state court jurisdiction con-
cluding that since the Tribal Council had consented to such jurisdic-
tion, no infringement of the Tribe's self-government rights would oc-
cur.98 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where there is an
Act of Congress involved, its requirements must be complied with
explicitly. Moreover, the Court held that failure to meet the first re-
quirement of the Williams analysis-compliance with the governing
federal act, cannot be cured by meeting the second portion of such
analysis-showing no interference with the Tribe's right to govern
itself.97
5. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission
But as important as Warren and Kennerly were, their impact
was far exceeded by the Court's broad and far reaching decision in
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission."8 Although the case
involved the question of a State's authority to impose its income tax
on an Indian (rather than a question about jurisdiction over non-
Indians on reservations), the Court's analysis of the entire area of
federal-state-tribal relationships and its review of the various author-
ities governing those relationships has a direct and important bear-
ing on questions of state jurisdiction over non-Indians as well.
A resident of the Navajo Indian Reservation brought suit against
the Arizona Tax Commission to obtain a refund of state income taxes
withheld from her income earned on the reservation. There appear-
ed to be no applicable federal law prohibiting imposition of the tax,99
even by implication as in Warren Trading Post. Nor, if Kennerly and
Public Law 280 are read as involving state court procedural jurisdic-
tion rather than the state's authority to impose its substantive laws,
94. Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. IV, §§ 401-406, 82 Stat. 73, codified
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1970).
95. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1970). The 1968 amendment also authorized states to eliminate
any constitutional or statutory impediments to assumption of such jurisdiction. Id. § 1324.
96. Kennerly v. District Court, 154 Mont. 488, 466 P.2d 85 (1970).
97. 400 U.S. 423, 426-27 (1971).
98. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
99. Relying on Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962), the Arizona
court held that the language in the Arizona Enabling Act and Constitution requiring that
lands within Indian reservations remain "under the absolute jurisdiction and control of
the Congress of the United States" (36 Stat. 569) allowed concurrent state jurisdiction so
long as tribal self-government was not infringed upon. 14 Ariz. App. 452, 484 P.2d 221
(1971).
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did there appear to be an applicable federal law authorizing such jur-
isdiction subject to compliance with procedural requirements. Ac-
cordingly the case seemed to be subject to resolution on the basis of
the second portion of the Williams analysis; namely, whether impo-
sition of the tax on individual Indians infringed on the right of reser-
vation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. As not-
ed above, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's refus-
al to require the refund, concluding that imposition of the state in-
come tax on an individual Indian did not cause an impairment of the
right of the Navajo Tribe to be self-governing. 100
The Court immediately perceived the conflict between the rights
of the Tribe and the authority of the State which it was being asked
to resolve:
This case requires us once again to reconcile the plenary pow-
er of the States over residents within their borders with the
semi-autonomous status of Indians living on Tribal reserva-
tions.'01
The Court approached resolution of that conflict by again review-
ing the principles of Indian sovereignty first articulated in Worces-
ter v. Georgia, and, as indicated below, by acknowledging the evolu-
tion of those principles over the years:
This is not to say that the Indian sovereignty doctrine, with
its concommitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of state law,
has remained static in the 141 years since Worcester was de-
cided. Not surprisingly, the doctrine has undergone consid-
erable evolution in response to changed circumstances....
[N]otions of Indian sovereignty have been adjusted to take
account of the State's legitimate interests in regulating the
affairs of non-Indians....
... [T] he trend has been away from the idea of inherent sov-
ereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on
federal preemption .... The modern cases thus tend to avoid
reliance on platonic notions of Indian sovereignty and to look
instead to the applicable treaties and statutes which define
the limits of state power. 0 2
The Court then summarized the current status of the Indian sov-
ereignty doctrine and its applicability in jurisdictional disputes:
The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant then, not because
it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but
because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read.10 3
100. 14 Ariz. App. at 457, 484 P.2d at 224.
101. 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
102. Id. at 171-72.
103. Id. at 172.
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Being mindful of Indian sovereignty concepts, and applying the
canon of construction that "doubtful expressions are to be resolved in
favor of the weak and defenseless people who are wards of the na-
tion,",04 the Court reviewed the Navajo Treaty of 1868,105 establish-
ing the reservation as an area for the use and occupation of the
Indians free from entry by non-Indians except agents of the United
States; the Arizona Enabling Act,106 wherein the state confirmed the
"absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
States" over the reservation; the Buck Act, 10 7 authorizing imposition
of certain state taxes in federal areas, but providing exceptions for
Indians; and, the 1968 Civil Rights Act provisions authorizing state
acquisition of jurisdiction over Indians on reservations by compliance
with certain procedural requirements. 10 8 The Court concluded that
the treaty and each of the statutes reflected or was consistent with
a federal intent that the reservation Indians not be subject to Ari-
zona's tax.
Of particular interest is the Court's response to Arizona's con-
tention that since the tax was imposed on an individual Indian it could
not infringe on the Navajo tribal rights of self-government; hence
the tax did not violate the standard enunciated in Williams v. Lee.
The Court rejected the attempted distinction between "individual"
and "Tribe," indicating that the critical point was the fact that the
income which the state sought to tax was earned on the reservation.1 "
Of greater importance to this investigation is the fact that for
the first time the Court expressly characterized as "legitimate" the
interests of states in exercising jurisdiction over non-Indians on re-
servations, advising that it is in such situations that the Williams v.
Lee "infringement" analysis is applicable.
It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams
test have dealt principally with situations involving non-In-
dians. [citation ommitted] In these situations, both the tribe
and the State. could fairly claim an interest in asserting their
respective jurisdictions. The Williams test was designed to
104. Id. at 174, citing Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 867 (1930).
105. 15 Stat. 667, 668.
106. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 20, 36 Stat. 557, 569.
107. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105, et seq. (1970).
108. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (1970). Commentators have found it curious that the Court
did not simply dispose of the question on the basis that Arizona had failed to comply
with the mandatory federal mechanisms for acquisition of jurisdiction, as It did in Ken-
nerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971). Although the opinion does not say so, the
Court probably resisted that temptation (which would have produced a perfectly appropri-
ate result in view of the language of the Navajo Treaty and of the State Enabling Act)
In an effort to establish and apply an analytical scheme which would have general appli-
cation. The Court seems to have been suggesting that while the jurisdictional acquisition
mechanisms in the Civil Rights Act must be complied with by states which do not other-
wise have such jurisdiction, the nature of treaties applicable to particular tribes Or other
federal statutes may properly grant jurisdiction to states in other' ways. Hence, the analy-
sis of the treaty and all applicable federal statutes was warranted.
109. 411 U.S. at 179-81.
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resolve this conflict by providing that the State could protect
its interest up to the point where tribal self-government would
be affected. 110
In summary, McClanahan instructs that although sovereignty
concepts are relevant, they are to be utilized as "backdrop" to a
reading of federal statutes and treaties, and that the real issue is one
of federal preemption. Further, States do have a legitimate interest
in regulating the affairs of non-Indians on reservations, and may do
so in conformity with applicable federal statutes and up to the point
where such regulation interferes with the right of the Tribe to govern
itself.
The Supreme Court has issued a number of significant opinions
on Indian matters since McClanahan,"' several of which have been
noted above for various purposes. None of them, however, has a
direct bearing on the issue of state jurisdiction over non-Indians on
Indian reservations. Accordingly the basis for any generalized test
for the measurement of such jurisdiction is to be found in the fore-
going decisions."12
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A TEST TO MEASURE STATE JURISDIC-
TION OVER NON-INDIANS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS
The purpose of this review of the Supreme Court decisions has
been to provide a basis for formulation of a generalized analytical
tool or test which will predict with a useful degree of certainty the ex-
tent to which a state may apply one or more of its statutes to the activ-
ities of a non-Indian mineral operation on an Indian reservation. The
cases reviewed do seem to provide an adequate foundation for state-
ment of such a test.
A number of rational approaches for categorizing and analyzing
such cases and for creating a general test have been suggested. For
example, petitioners in McClanahan argued that the extent of the
state's jurisdiction should be measured by consideration of three fac-
110. Id. at 179.
111. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) ; Satiacum v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1 (1973)
Washlngton Game Department v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) ; Oneida Indian Na-
tion v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974) ; Morton v. Rutz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974) ; Mor-
ton v. Mancarl, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) ; United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) ; An-
toine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975); and, DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420
U.S. 425 (1975). The Puyallup and Antoine decisions are particularly interesting in that
they suggest the potential for the states' exercise of jurisdiction over Indians In connec-
tion with regulation of off-reservation hunting and fishing rights guaranteed to the In-
dians by treaty. No case involving on-reservation regulation has yet been considered but,
on the basis of McOlanahan, no inherent distinction from the off-reservation cases is im-
mediately appar'ent. Rather, the language of the treaty creating the reservation would be
controlling and might or might not prevent exercise of such jurisdiction on a reservation.
112. For an excellent general review of the development of federal, state and tribal Juris-
dictional relationships on Indian reservations see Indian Civil Rights Task Force, "De-
velopment of Tripartite Jurisdiction in Indian Country," 22 KAN. L. REv. 351 (1974).
See also, the general discussion in Federal Indian Law, supra note 8.
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tors; namely, (i) situs of the activity with respect to which the state
was seeking to exercise jurisdiction as being on or off the reservation;
(ii) status of the individuals involved as Indian or non-Indian; and
(iii) consideration of the subject matter involved as being within or
without tribal jurisdiction."" Although there is merit in this analysis,
it has never been adopted or discussed in Supreme Court decisions,
including McClanahan. One reason may be that it seems to rely heav-
ily on sovereignty notions as enunciated in Worcester v. Georgia
and therefore does not adequately reflect the controlling nature of ap-
plicable treaties and statutes as recognized in McClanahan.1"1
Instead the Supreme Court has adopted the approach suggested
in Williams v. Lee and explained and refined in McClanahan. Based
on such decisions, and the other cases reviewed above, it is submitted
that the analysis to determine the permissible extent of state juris-
diction over non-Indian activities on a reservation within which a
tribe has been authorized to govern itself, can be stated in a series of
questions, as follows:
(1) To what extent do federal treaties and statutes or reg-
ulations thereunder indicate a federal intent to permit or pro-
hibit exercise of such jurisdiction? Consideration should be
given to:
(a) Treaties or statutes which grant such jurisdiction.-
(b) Treaties or statutes which deny or limit such juris-
diction, such denial being in the form of:
(i) an express denial or limitation of jurisdiction; or
(ii) a conditional grant of jurisdiction, the conditions
not having been met; or
(iii) an implied denial or limitation of jurisdiction.
(2) In the absence of federal treaties or statutes granting or
denying such jurisdiction, to what extent will exercise of such
state jurisdiction infringe on the rights of the tribe to make
its own laws and to be governed by them?
In utilizing the foregoing analysis, the following factors should
be considered:
(1) Doubtful expressions in treaties and statutes will pro-
bably be resolved in favor of the tribe, and can be expected
to be interpreted by courts to maximize the rights of the tribe
to govern itself. 115
(2) States have a legitimate interest in exercising jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians on Indian reservations."81
(3) Notions of Indian sovereignty alone are no longer-dispos-
113. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, Briefs of Council at 36 L. Ed.
2d 989. The analysis is based upon the late Felix Cohen's definitive work, Handbook ol
Federal Indian Law (1942) upon which Federal Indian Law, supra note 8, is based.
114. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
115. See the case citations at note 24 supra.
116. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
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itive of jurisdictional disputes between federal, state and tri-
bal governments, but they do provide a "backdrop" against
which federal treaties and statutes are to be read and evalu-
ated. 117
(4) The federal government has complete and paramount au-
thority over Indian tribes, their reservations, and the activi-
ties of Indians and non-Indians on them. 11
No reason is perceived why the foregoing general approach should
not be fully applicable to questions concerning state regulation of act-
ivities of non-Indian mineral operators on Indian reservations. Ap-
plication of the analysis to that particular issue merely involves con-
sideration not only of the federal treaties and statutes relating to the
tribe, its reservation and to the state, but of a variety of federal stat-
utes and regulations dealing with mineral activities on such reserva-
tions as well. Such evaluation of treaties and statutes having par-
ticular application to the substantive subject matter of the state's
attempted exercise of jurisdiction is precisely the approach utilized
by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee and in McClanahan."9
V. REVIEW OF THE TEST AS APPLIED TO STATE JURISDIC-
TION OVER MINERAL ACTIVITIES
Although by definition, the kinds of conclusions which will be
reached by application of the test in specific cases will be dependent
on the provisions of (i) the treaties and federal statutes of general ap-
plication to the Indian tribe and its reservation; (ii) specific federal
statutes, if any, applicable to the subject matter with respect to which
the state is asserting jurisdiction; and (iii) the nature of the state
statutes in question, it will be of value to review the various elements
of the test and utilize that review as an organizational approach to
consider factors which will tend to be generally applicable in most
cases.
It should be noted that some federal statutory schemes apply dir-
ectly to non-Indian activities on reservations. Regulation of non-
Indian traders as reviewed in Warren Trading Post is an example.
But most of the statutes to be considered apply by their terms to Indi-
ans and Indian reservations rather than to non-Indians. Nevertheless
they are relevant to this inquiry. If a state has been granted jurisdic-
tion over Indians themselves, its jurisdiction over non-Indians on the
reservation will be at least coextensive since any limitations on state
jurisdiction over non-Indians are based upon protected rights of the
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
119. In Williams v. Lee the Court evaluated federal statutes having a bearing on the
Navajo tribal court system. 358 U.S. 217, 222 (1959). In McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission, the Court reviewed the only federal enactment having a bearing on state
taxing authority on Indian reservations. 411 U.S. 164, 176 (1973).
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Indians themselves. Conversely, if a treaty or statute expressly den-'
ies jurisdiction over Indians, such fact will have an impact upon de-
termination of the point at which state regulation of non-Indian con-
duct will improperly infringe on tribal self-government.
A. APPLICABLE TREATIES AND FEDERAL STATUTES
1. Treaties or Statutes Granting State Jurisdiction
No treaties were encountered which grant jurisdiction to state
governments, although no effort was made to conduct a systematic
review of Indian treaties for this purpose. The apparent absence of
such grants of jurisdiction in treaties is not surprising since any such
arrangement would be fundamentally at odds with the concepts of
federal plenary power over the responsibility for Indian affairs under
the Commerce and Treaty powers of the United States Constitution.
12 0
Congress has acted by statute on several occasions, however, to
make general grants to various states of jurisdiction over Indians and
their reservations.121 By far the most important of these Acts was
Public Law 280122 enacted in 1953, which made an outright grant of
such jurisdiction to five states,'1 23 and which provided for acquisition
of jurisdiction by other states.124 The Act was amended in certain par-
ticulars by Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,125 although the lan-
guage describing the scope of authority acquired by the states was
not modified.
The extent of the jurisdiction acquired by states under Public Law
280 has been subject to question. The Act provides that "those civil
120. Supra notes 14, 15.
121. See, e.g., Act of July 2, 1948, ch. 809, 62 Stat. 1224 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 232
et seq. (1970)) granting to New York civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indians within
that state without regard to their presence on or off reservations.
122. Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588.
123. Id. Section 4, provided in part:
"(a) Each of the states listed in the following table shall have jurisdiction over
civil causes of action or to which Indians are parties which arise In the areas of Indian
country listed opposite the name of the state to the same extent that such State has jur-
isdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such state that are of
general application to private persons or private property shall have the same force and
effect within such Indian country as they have elsewhere within the State:
"State of Indian country affected
California - All Indian country within the State
Minnesota - All Indian country within the State, except the Red Lake Reservation
Nebraska - All Indian country within the State
Oregon - All Indian country within the State, except the Warm Springs Reservation
Wisconsin - All Indian country within the State, except the Menominee Reservation."
124. Id. Section 7. For example, Montana acquired criminal, but not civil, jurisdiction
over the Flathead Reservation in 1963 (Mont. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 83-801 to 83-806 (1966)).
Although the Supreme Court has clearly held that Congress intended that Public Law 280
and its successors were to be the exclusive and mandatory mechanisms by which states
not having jurisdiction on Indian reservations could acquire such jurisdiction (Kennerly
v. District Court of Montana, 400 U.S. 423 (1971)) an apparently unresolved question Is
the extent to which the limitations on jurisdiction in Public Law 280 (as considered below)
also limit the jurisdictional authority of states which acquired such jurisdiction by treaty,
statute or agreement prior to its enactment.
125. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1970). Hereafter references to Public Law 280 will include
such later amendments unless specifed to the contrary.
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laws of such state that are of general application to private persons
or private property shall have the same force and effect within such
Indian country or part thereof as they have elsewhere within that
state."'126 That language has been interpreted by the Department of
Interior as giving the states jurisdiction over persons and private
property (Indian and non-Indian) within reservations, but as not
granting jurisdiction over property held in trust by the United States
for the benefit of individual Indians or the Tribe. 127 No known resolu-
tion of this uncertainty has been made to date. If the position taken
by the Department of Interior is correct, however, it could mean
that Public Law 280 does not grant jurisdiction to states over miner-
al rights held in trust for the Tribe or individual Indians. According-
ly, it may be that even if a state has been granted or has acquired jur-
isdiction on an Indian reservation under Public Law 280, absent other
federal statutes having a controlling impact, the authority of such
state to exercise jurisdiction over a non-Indian lessee of such miner-
al rights would be subject to the "infringement" portion of the Wil-
liams test as discussed below.
Another uncertainty relates to the general substantive scope of
jurisdictional authority acquired by states under Public Law 280,
apart from express limitations in the statute. The Supreme Court ex-
pressly declined to determine in McClanahan whether Arizona would
have been free to impose its tax statute on the reservation if it had
complied with Public Law 280.128 However, in what appears to be the
first appellate decision on the point, the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals recently held that the language of Public Law 280 (as it appears
in 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1958)) includes all civil laws of general applica-
tion in the state."9 On the facts of that case, the court held that the
state was free to apply its income tax laws to Indians and their non-
reservation income. The case clearly stands for the general prop-
osition that all state laws would be applicable on the reservation in
the same manner as they apply elsewhere in the state, subject to ex-
press limitations on such jurisdiction in the statute. The issue will
undoubtedly be litigated further as other types of state laws are ap-
plied to Indians on reservations.
Differing from the approach reflected in Public Law 280, Con-
126. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1970).
127. Department of Interior, Office of the Solicitor, Opinion M-36768, February 7, 1968
(unpublished):
"Generally, it is the position of this Department that Public Law 280 invests the
states, which were granted or have assumed jurisdiction thereunder, with civil and crimi-
eal jurisdiction over the persons and private (nontrust) property of Indians within the
Indian country. Jurisdiction over trust property, including authority to regulate its use,
was largely unaffected by the Act and remains as and where it was prior to its passage."
(at 2) citing Snohomish v. Seattle Disposal Company, 425 P.2d 22, 70 Wash. 2d 668, cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
128. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 178, n.18 (1973).
129. Omaha Tribe of Indians v. Peters, 516 F.2d 133 (8th Cir. 1975).
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gress has also acted to grant jurisdiction to states in specific subject
matter areas. For example, in 1929 Congress authorized the Secre-
tary of the Interior, pursuant to rules and regulations to be adopted,
to permit state officials to enter reservations for purposes of inspect-
ing health and education conditions and to enforce sanitation and
quarantine regulations. 30 It can be argued that the statute provides
a basis for imposition of a variety of state statutes which have a re-
lationship to "health" and "sanitation." The argument has not been
developed in the literature and apparently has not been consid-
ered by a court. The Department of Interior has not issued rules
or regulations governing the circumstances under which states may
conduct such inspections. The Solicitor has taken the position
that the statute is not self-executing, and that in the absence of such
regulations and the necessary permission from the Secretary of the
Interior, the states have no rights under the statute.' 3 ' It appears
doubtful that the statute would be held to constitute general consent
by the United States to exercise of state jurisdiction without affirma-
tive approval by the Secretary of the Interior. Even if such consent
has been or is hereafter given, the rights granted to the states relate
merely to inspections, with enforcement rights only for quarantine
and sanitation purposes. Such narrow objectives would provide shaky
support, at best, for state statutes not conforming closely to the lan-
guage in Section 231 and limiting state jurisdiction to such pur-
poses.'132
Congress has also acted to expressly grant states jurisdiction to
tax Indian royalty shares of mineral production on Indian reserva-
tions in certain circumstances. 25 U.S.C § 398,'13 providing for leas-
ing of unallotted lands on Indian reservations for "oil and gas min-
ing purposes" contains the following proviso:
Provided, that the production of oil and gas and other min-
erals on such lands may be taxed by the State in which said
lands are located in all respects the same as production on
unrestricted' lands, and the Secretary of the Interior is au-
thorized and directed to cause to be paid the tax so assessed
against the royalty interests on said lands. .... 134
That statute is now little used, having been largely supplanted by pro-
130. Act of February 15, 1929, ch. 216, 45 Stat. 1185, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1970).
131. Supra note 127 at 4. Citing Superior Sand and Gravel Mining Co. v. Territory of
Alaska, 224 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1955) and Dredge Corporation v. Penny, 362 F.2d 889 (9th
Cir. 1966).
182. An opinion bY North Dakota's Attorney General concluded that Section 231 did not
apply to mining operations so as to authorize the State Coal Mine Inspector to inspect or
require licensing of mining operations in Indian territory. Opinion, N.D. Att'y Gen. 360
(January 2. 1970), State-State Mine Inspector-Authorityj on Reservations.
183. Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244, codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1970).
184. Id.
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visions of the Tribal Leasing Act of 19381- 5 which is now commonly
utilized for Indiaii mineral leasing purposes. Section 398 has been up-
held by the Supreme Court as a valid grant of taxing authority with
respect to leases issued thereunder, 1 36 but there is authority to the
effect that it is not a grant of taxing authority with respect to leases
issued under other statutory authority.' 37 Although, as indicated, this
particular statute is now little utilized, it does provide a good example
of an express Congressional grant of authority to the states.
Acting through the Secretary of the Interior, the United States
has recently begun expressly to require compliance by mineral les-
sees with certain state laws having application to their operations.
The Secretary is authorized to issue mineral leases under such rules
and regulations as he may promulgate, and on such terms (subject
to limitations imposed by statute or the tribe) as he determines to be
in the best interests of the Indians."" Apparently pursuant to that au-
thority,139 certain of the coal leases issued or proposed to be issued on
the Crow Indian Reservation in Montana pursuant to public sales in
1968 require lessees to:
Fully comply with the provisions of the statutes of the State
of Montana covering workmen's compensation and occupa-
tional disease, as are now in force or as may be amended.
Further, the lessee agrees to comply with all the terms and
provisions of all applicable laws of the State of Montana and
of the United States of America as now exist or as may be
amended, pertaining to Social Security, unemployment com-
pensation, wages, hours, and conditions of labor ... 140
Such provision imposes a clear contractual obligation on the les-
see to comply with state law. Whether it constitutes a grant of juris-
dictional authority to the state is less clear. In any event, subsequent
135. Act of May 11, 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396f
(1970).
136. British-American Oil Producing Company v. Board of Equalization of the State of
Montana, 299 U.S. 159 (1936).
137. Santa Rita Oil & Gas Co. v. Board of Equalization, 101 Mont. 268, 54 P.2d 117(1936), rev'd in part, 112 Mont. 359, 116 P.2d 1012 (1941).
138. 25 U.S.C. § 896d (1970).
139. No portion of the regulations promulgated by the Department of Interior for leasing
of tribal lands for mining provides for or authorizes lease terms which require the lessee
to comply with state laws. See 25 C.F.R. Part 171 (1975). Although there is some author-
ity to the effect that action by the Secretary of Interior in approving a lease of Indian
lands which is inconsisent with the regulations constitutes a modification of such regula-
tions with respect to such lease (See Whitebird v. Eagle-Picher Co., 258 F. Supp. 308(N.D. Okla. 1966), and Hallam v. Commerce Mining & Royalty Co., 49 F.2d 103 (10th Cir.
1931)) the more recent and compelling authority is that such regulations cannot be
promulgated or modified except as provided in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1970) (See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974). Any uncertainty about the ef-fectiveness of such lease terms may be resolved, however, by the fact that issuance of
such leases were approved by the Crow Tribe in accordance with the provisions of the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
140. See Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Crow Indian Agency,
Crow Agency, Montana, Notice of Competitive Sale No. 1, Exclusive Coal Prospecting Per-
mit With Option to Lease Restricted Indian Lands for Coal Mining, February 27, 1968,
Coal Mining Lease Indian Lands, Paragraph 21, at 8.
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modifications in the lease form to eliminate or change such require-
ments, as approved by the Secretary of the Interior and the tribe,
would rescind or adjust any such basis for state jurisdiction.
In summary, in states where jurisdiction over Indians on Indian
reservations has been granted outright or later acquired under
Public Law 280 mechanisms, or pursuant to other statutes or federal
action, the authority of the state to regulate activities of non-Indian
mineral lessees on such reservations is clear, subject (i) to uncertain-
ties about the scope of state jurisdiction over tribal lands, as noted
above; (ii) to express limitations contained in such statutes, as noted
below; or (iii) to dictates, of other controlling federal statutes. In such
states, the second portion of the test-relating to infringement upon
the rights of the Indians to govern themselves-is not considered be-
cause the federal statutes are controlling.
B. TREATIES OR STATUTES DENYING OR LIMITING STATE JURIS-
DICTION
Express Denials
As noted in McClanahan with respect to the Navajo Treaty, Ind-
ian treates are often worded in terms of the exclusion of non-Ind-
ians from the defined reservation area, except for persons authoriz-
ed to enter by the Indians themselves or representatives of the Unit-
ed States, 1 41 rather than in terms of the jurisdictional authority of the
state in which the reservation is located. The treaties therefore often
expressly deny public access to the reservations by express terms,
but the principle impact of such treaties on the scope of state juris-
diction is by implication, as considered below.
Federal Enabling Acts authorizing creation of various western
states often contain express language which may constitute a denial
of state jurisdiction over Indian reservations. Typical language ap-
pears in the Montana Enabling Act, which provides in part:
And said Indian lands shall remain under the absolute juris-
diction and control of the Congress of the United States.142
The Montana Statute applied also to North Dakota, South Dakota,
and Washington. Identical provisions are found in the Acts admitting
New Mexico1 43 and Utah' 44 and in the Constitutions of Idaho145 and
141. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973). See also
the Crow Treaty of May 7, 1868, 15 Stat. 649.
142. Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4. 25 Stat. 676, 677.
143. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. 557, 558-559.
144. Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108.
145. Idaho Const. Art. XXI, § 19 (1890), ratified, Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, 26 Stat.
215.
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Wyoming.'"4 Insofar as Indians themselves are concerned, the lan-
guage in such Enabling Acts or Constitutions is effective to bar ex-
ercise of state jurisdiction over Indians on the reservations.14 7
However, with respect to activities of non-Indians on Indian re-
servations, it does not appear that such language in statehood En-
abling Acts or Constitutions operates as a bar to state jurisdiction.
Such conclusion is based upon recent Supreme Court decisions 48
which rely heavily upon the prior holdings of McBratney14 9 and Dra-
per. 50 As indicated above, the Court's conclusion in McBratney ap-
peared primarily to be dependent upon the peculiar chronological
order in which territorial authorizing acts and treaties creating In-
dian reservations were adopted. The conclusion in McBratney was ac-
cepted without critical analysis in Draper, although the pertinent
statutes and treaties were entirely different. Further, in Draper the
meaning of the quoted language in the Montana Enabling Act was in-
terpreted in light of the General Allotment Act of 1887; an analysis
which, even if valid when the decision was rendered, is now question-
able in view of the later decisions by the Supreme Court holding that
the General Allotment Act of 1887 did not in and of itself contem-
plate termination of Indian reservations. 15'
Those early decisions, as well as the Supreme Court's decision
in Williams v. Lee,' 5 2 led the court in Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan 53 to interpret the disclaimer language narrowly:
"Absolute" federal jurisdiction is not invariably exclusive
jurisdiction. 54
Notwithstanding the presence of similar language in Arizona's
Enabling Act, 55 the Supreme Court in McClanahan confirmed the le-
gitimacy of state interests in regulating non-Indian activities on In-
dian reservations.15 Similarly, in Williams v. Lee, also involving Ar-
izona's Enabling Act, the Court acknowledged that states have
been allowed to exercise jurisdiction in instances where "essential
tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians
would not be jeopardized .... 1157 Accordingly, in Williams, having
146. Wyo. Const. Art. XXI, 26 (1890), ratified, Act of July 10, 1890, ch. 664, 26 Stat.
222.
147. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973), and Wil-
liams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
148. Id. See also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
149. United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).
150. Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
151. See text and cases at note 41 supra.
152. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
153. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
154. Id. at 68.
155. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 569.
156. 411 U.S. at 171, 179.
157. 358 U.S. at 219.
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determined that the, language in the Enabling Act was not disposi-
tive of the jurisdictional question, the Court resolved the issues based
on whether or not exercise of such jurisdiction by Arizona infringed
on the rights of the Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.
On the basis of the foregoing decisions, even though there are
substantial questions about the logic of the early cases, the clear cur-
rent state of the law appears to be that such disclaiming language in
state enabling acts or constitutions is not an absolute bar to exercise
of jurisdiction by such states over non-Indian activities on Indian re-
servations.
Notwithstanding such conclusion, however, recent decisions by
a Federal District Court and the Montana Attorney General have
reached an opposite result in evaluating state jurisdiction over non-
Indian mineral operators. In Shoshone Indian Tribe v. Hathaway1 58
a non-Indian operator on the Wind River Reservation applied to the
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission for approval of a
water flood project. The state commission accepted jurisdiction and
ruled on the application over protest of the Shoshone and Arapahoe
Tribes. Thereafter the Tribes brought the action in Federal District
Court to enjoin enforcement of the Commission's order as applied to
the Reservation. Without a detailed analysis of the legal principles,
the Court found that the Commission had no jurisdiction to enter its
order. The opinion merely noted the jurisdictional disclaimer lan-
uage in the Wyoming Constitution, the Indian sovereignty concepts
enunciated in Worcester v. Georgia, and the fact that Indian terri-
tory is separate and apart from that of the state.159 The Court did not
make an effort to consider the treaties establishing the reservation
or the federal' statutes and regulations governing oil and gas leasing
and operations on Indian reservations. Further the Court did not at-
tempt to distinguish between state jurisdiction over Indians and state
jurisdiction over non-Indians.
In 1973 the Montana Attorney General rendered an opinion160 on
the extent to which Montana's Strip Mining and Reclamation Act''
applied to coal strip mining activities on the Northern Cheyenne Res-
ervation. It too concludes that the state has no jurisdiction to impose
such statute, relying on the disclaimer language in the Montana En-
158. No. 5367 Civil (D., Wyo., Nov. 7, 1969) (Order Sustaining Motion for Summary
Judgment and Overruling Motion to Dismiss). The positions of the parties and the facts
In the case were reviewed in detail in the Berger and Mounce article, supra note 5, at
379-396.
159. Id., at 3-4.
160. Opinion No. 54, Montana Attorney General (December 28, 1973).
161. Mont. Rev. Code §§ 50-1034 to 50-1057 (Supp. 1974).
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abling Act 162 and Constitution 63 and on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Kennerly: 164
It appears from the foregoing authorities that a state has no
jurisdiction over Indian lands unless Congress has authorized
that jurisdiction, the state has acted to accept that jurisdic-
tion, and the Indian tribal members have voted to accept the
state's jurisdiction. 16 5
The opinion does not consider the treaties applicable to the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe or Reservation, the federal statutes and regulations
pertaining to coal leasing and operations, and makes no distinction
between state jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians.
Although each of the foregoing decisions is seriously deficient in
the analytical approach utilized, for the reasons set forth below 66
each seems to have arrived at the proper result.
Another type of express limitation on state jurisdiction, not re-
lating to its scope, but concerning the kinds of impact which it may
have, is contained in Public Law 280 and its successors.
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, en-
cumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal property, in-
cluding water rights, belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe,
band, or community that is held in trust by the United States
or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the
United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such
property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty,
agreement or statute, or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto .... 167
Although the statute is concerned with state acquisition of jur-
isdiction over Indians rather than acquisition of jurisdiction over
non-Indians on reservations, limitations in the statute on the
kinds of impacts which exercise of jurisdiction may have on Indian
property should operate equally as a limitation on the exercise of
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Specifically, exercise of state juris-
diction over non-Indians on Indian reservations may not result in
the "encumbrance" of any Indian property located on the reservation
which is held in trust by the United States or subject to a restriction
on alienation imposed by the United States.
The meaning of the prohibition against "encumbrances" on In-
dian property is subject to considerable uncertainty. For example, the
162. Act of February 22, 1889, 25 Stat. 676.
163. Mont. Const. Art. I (1972).
164. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971).
165. Supra note 160, at 3.
166. See text at notes 185 to 218 and 223 to 247, infra.
167. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1970).
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cases which have considered the question to date are in conflict
about whether the prohibition precludes application of state zoning
and general police power ordinances to Indian lands. In Snohomish
County v. Seattle Disposal Co., 1 68 the Supreme Court of Washington
held that state statutes and county ordinances requiring a conditional
use permit for garbage dumping operations on Indian lands by a non-
Indian lessee constituted an impermissible "encumbrance" on the
property and could not be imposed against the Indian tribe or its
lessee. The decision is of particular importance because it clearly
involves application of Public Law 280 limitations to asserted state
jurisdiction over non-Indian activities.
The Department of Interior has taken a position in conformity
with the Snohomish decision, issuing through the Solicitor's Office an
opinion concluding that state zoning and conservation laws are an
"encumbrance" within the prohibition of Public Law 280.169
Conversely, however, in Rincon Band of Mission Indians v.
County of San Diego,'170 a Federal District Court held that a county
ordinance prohibiting utilization of property within a county for
gambling purposes was not an "encumbrance" as it applied to In-
dian lands, because it was directed at conduct not land use. Accord-
ingly, imposition of the ordinance was held not to constitute a vio-
lation of the statutory prohibitions in Public Law 280. Similar con-
clusions were reached in an unreported Federal District Court de-
cision in California, Ricci v. County of Riverside,'1 7 and in a Califor-
nia appellate decision, People v. Rhodes. 1 72 The Rincon and Ricci de-
cisions were reversed on appeal1 73 on the basis of lack of a clear
case or controversy within constitutional requirements because of
nonenforcement of the ordinances by such counties.1 7 4
Another express limitation on the permissible scope of state
jurisdiction on Indian reservations can be found in the regulations
of the Department of Interior pertaining to Indian matters. 25 C.F.R.
§ 1.4 provides in part:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section,
none of the laws, ordinances, codes, resolutions, rules or other
regulations of any State or political subdivision thereof limit-
ing, zoning or otherwise governing, regulating or controlling
the use or development of any real or personal property,
168. 70 Wash. 2d 668, 425 P.2d 22, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
169. Supra note 127.
170. 324 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Cal. 1971).
171. Civ. No. 71-1132-EC (C.D. Cal., Sept. 9, 1971).
172. 12 Cal. App. 3d 720, 90 Cal. Rptr. 794 (1970).
173. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974).
174. A thorough review of the current state of the law on the meaning of the "encum-
brance" prohibition in Public Law 280 can be found in a recent comment in the Land and
Water Law Review. Comment, "State Jurisdiction Over Indian Land Use: An Interpreta-
tion of the Encumbrance Savings Clause of Public Law 280," IX Land and Water L. Rev,
4 1 (1974).
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including water rights, shall be applicable to any such proper-
ty leased from or held or used under agreement with and
belonging to any Indian or Indian tribe, band or community
that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States . 7 5
The regulation, enacted on June 9, 1965, recites that it is based upon
statutory authority contained in 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1970). However, whe-
ther such statute provides an independent basis for rule making by the
Secretary has been questioned. In Organized Village of Kake v.
Egan,17 Justice Frankfurter discussed the statute and concluded that
it did not provide an independent basis for the regulations thereunder
consideration. In that discussion he noted that it is the apparent
position of the Department of the Interior itself that the statute mere-
ly authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to implement specific
laws, rather than constituting a separate grant of general power to
make rules governing Indian conduct. 177 In Norvel v. Sangre de Cris-
to Development Company, Inc.,1 78 a Federal District Court reached
a similar conclusion, holding that 25 U.S.C. § 2 confers only the
authority to implement specific laws 79 and that "To the extent that
Regulation 1.4 would preclude application of the state laws discussed
above, (pertaining to subdivision control, construction licensing and
water) it must be viewed as unauthorized legislative action by the
Secretary and, as such, beyond the scope of his lawful authority."1 8
On the basis of these decisions, it must be concluded that 25
C.F.R. § 1.4 probably does not constitute a valid limitation on state
jurisdiction.18°a
Implied Denials or Limitation on State Jurisdiction. As noted
above'8 ' the principal impact of Indian treaties on state juris-
diction is by implication. Such treaties commonly reserved defined
areas to the sole use and occupancy of the Indians, but said little, if
anything, about relationships of the tribe to the surrounding state or
territory. 182 Treaty provisions for areas of exclusive use and occupan-
175. 25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1975). Subparagraph (b) of the section merely provides that the
Secretary of the Interior may in specific cases and in specific areas adopt such laws or
make them applicable to Indian lands If he determines such to be in the best interest of
the Indian owners in achieving the "highest and best use of such property."
176. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
177. Id. at 63. But see Memorandum Opinion, supra note 127.
178. 372 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.M. 1974), reversed on the basis of a lack of case or con-
troversy, 519 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1975).
179. Id. at 355.
180. Id. at 357.
180a. But see Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, Civil No. 74-1565 (9th Cir.
November 3, 1975) in which the regulation was upheld as valid.
181. Text at note 141 supra.
182. There are, of course, exceptions to this general statement. The Treaty of May 6,
1828, with the Cherokee Nation recites in its preamble:
. . . the anxious desire of the Government of the United States to secure
to the Cherokee nation of Indians . . . a permanent home, and which shall,
under the most solemn guarantee of the United States, be, and remain, theirs
forever-a home that shall never, in all future time, be embarrassed by having
296
NON-INDIAN MINERAL ACTIVITIES
cy, when considered in light of canons of construction applicable to
Indian treaties and notions of Indian sovereignty, were, however,
sufficient basis for the Supreme Court's conclusion in McClanahan11
that Indians on the reservation were not subject to the taxing au-
thority of Arizona.
[I]t cannot be doubted that the reservation of certain
lands for the exclusive use and occupancy of the Navajos
and the exclusion of non-Navajos from the prescribed area
was meant to establish the lands as within the exclusive sover-
eignty of the Navajos under general federal supervision. It
is thus unsurprising that this court has interpreted the Navajo
treaty to preclude extension of state law-including state tax
law-to Indians on the Navajo Reservation.1 4
Based on McClanahan and other decisions, it is clear that treaties
creating Indian reservations can and do operate to limit state juris-
diction on such reservations.
Federal statutes too can impliedly deny or limit the scope of
state jurisdiction on Indian reservations. Such effect is based on
familiar notions of federal supremacy over Indian affairs and federal
preemption of a subject matter area or establishment of a federal
policy which cannot be interfered with or thwarted by state acti-
vity.185
The Supreme Court's decision in Warren Trading Post expressly
applied such standards in resolving questions concerning Arizona's
authority to impose its sales tax on a non-Indian trader operating
on the Navajo reservation. As indicated above' the Court concluded
that the detailed federal statutory and regulatory framework gov-
erning the activities of such Indian traders on reservations showed
"that Congress has taken the business of Indian trading on reserva-
tions so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws imposing
additional burdens upon traders.' '1 87 To allow collection of such tax
extended around It the lines, or placed over It the jurisdiction of a Territory
or State, nor be pressed upon by the extension, In any way, of any of the
limits of any existing Territory or State . . . 7 Stat. 311.
183. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
184. Id. at 174-75. Although the Court thereafter reviewed a variety of federal statutes,
such review was for purposes of demonstrating the lack of any Congressional intent at
odds with the Court's interpretation of the treaty. It is clear that the Court's interpreta-
tion of the treaty is the fundamental basis for the opinion.
185. An exposition of the standards applicable to a determination of federal preemption
is far beyond the scope of this investigation. However, various approaches utilized by the
courts have included, among others, consideration of whether the state regulation is in con-
flict with the federal statute (Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960)) ;
or consideration of whether the nature and scope of the federal regulation is so complete
that a Congressional intent to be solely responsible for regulation in such area is shown(City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) ; Warren Trading Post
v. Arizona Tax Commission, 880 U.S. 685 (1965)). It is clear that such preemption can
be effected by federal administrative action, if such action is within the agency scope of
authority. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945).
186. See text at notes 87 to 90 supra.
187. 380 U.S. at 690. See 25 C.F.R. Part 251 (1975).
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would "frustrate the evident Congressional purpose of ensuring that
no burden" be placed on such traders except as authorized by federal
statute or regulation. 18
Applying the rationale of Warren Trading Post to non-Indian
mineral lessees and to their activities on Indian reservations, it is
apparent that a very strong case can be made for the proposition
that Congress has preempted the field of regulation of such lessees'
mineral operations, and that state land use, reclamation and conser-
vation regulations may not properly be imposed on such operators.
Pursuant to a variety of statutes, now codified at 25 U.S.C. §§
396-401 (1970), Congress has authorized the leasing of Indian land
subject to restrictions on alienation for mineral development, wheth-
er Tribal or held by individual allottees. The statutes, some broad in
application,5 9 some exceedingly narrow,190 generally provide for ap-
proval of such leases by the Secretary of the Interior' and for ap-
proval by the Tribal council with respect to unallotted lands 92 or by
the individual allottee, with respect to allotted lands. 93 The statute
gives the Secretary of the Interior complete control over operations
of lessees pursuant to such leases.
All operations under any oil, gas or other mineral lease :is-
sued pursuant to the terms of any act affecting restricted
Indian lands shall be subject to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. .... 194
Pursuant to such authority the Secretary has promulgated or ap-
plies exceedingly detailed regulations'9" which cover all aspects of
lease issuance,' 9 ' lessee operations 97 and management of the environ-
188. Id. at 691.
189. Act of May 11, 1938, oh. 198, § 1, 52 Stat. 347, 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1970) governs
leases for mining purposes of all unalloted lands held by Indian Tribes (except those sev-
eral tribes noted).
190. Act of April 28, 1924, ch. 135, 43 Stat. 111, 25 U.S.C. § 401 (1970) pertains solely
to leasing for mining purposes of unallotted lands reserved for cemetery, school and agency
uses and not needed for such purpose on the twenty acre Kaw Indian Reservation in Ok-
lahoma. U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal and State Indian Reservations and Indian
Trust Areas (1974).
191. See, for example, 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1970).
192. Id. See also 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1970). With respect to oil and gas leasing see A. Mc-
Lane, Oil and Gas Leasing On Indian Lands (1955) which, although now somewhat dated,
provides a detailed review of the subject.
193. See 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1970).
194. 25 U.S.C. § 296d (1970).
195. See generally, 25 C.F.R., Subchapters P and Q (1975).
196. The general regulations governing issuance of oil and gas and mining leases and
the terms and conditions thereof are set forth in 25 C.F.R. Part 171, with respect to tribal
lands, and 25 C.F.R. Part 172, with respect to alloted lands. However regulations pertain-
ing to mineral leasing on specific Indian reservations appear at 25 C.F.R. Part 173, re-
lating to the Crow Reservation in Montana; 25 C.F.R. Part 174, dealing with the Five
Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma; 25 C.F.R. Part 175, concerning the Osage Reservation in
Oklahoma and 25 C.F.R. Part 176 relating to lead and zinc mining leases on the Quapaw
Reservation in Oklahoma. The special regulations for the Crow Reservation are now no
longer utilized in view of the 1969 amendment to 25 U.S.C. § 369f (1970) making the 1938
Tribal Leasing Act applicable to the Crow Reservation. Act of Sept. 16, 1969, 73 Stat. 565.
Curiously such amendment is not reflected in the historical notes or supplement in 25
U.S.C.A. § 396f (1970).
197. Operations of lessees are subject to administrative control by the United States
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mental impact of such operations. 198
The lease issuance regulations are broad in scope and deal in
detail with matters such as procedures for Tribal and Secretarial
approval of leases; 119 qualifications of lessees; 200 term of the leases 201
and restrictions on commencement of operations.202
The regulations governing operations are equally broad in scope,
and if anything, even more detailed. The oil and gas operating regula-
tions 203 seem to fully control all aspects of such operations and speci-
fically provide that the officer designated by the Secretary of the
Interior 20 4 is "authorized and empowered to supervise and direct oil
and gas operations ' ' 205 on Indian lands subject thereto. The coal mine
operating regulations are similar in scope, authorizing supervision
and regulation of operations20 in order to assure orderly develop-
ment of coal resources without waste and consistent with the health
and safety of the workmen. 207 The regulations cover in detail, among
other things, the obligations of lessees to comply with the terms of
the leases and to keep records,2 8 preparation and advance approval
of development plans,2 0 9 and specific technical requirements for vari-
ous kinds of operations. 210 The regulations make only brief reference
to state laws or reports to state agencies.2 11
The proposed coal mine operating regulations are even more
comprehensive, 21 2 particularly with respect to environmental protec-
tion and land reclamation concerns. Their scope is reflected in the
statement of purpose:
(b) The purpose of the regulations in this part is to promote
Geological Survey. By adminatrative practice the coal mining operating regulations for
federal lands (30 C.F.R. Part 211 (1974)) are applied to operations on Indian reserva-
tions. Proposed revisions to 30 C.F.R. Part 211 were published for comment on January
30, 1975 and are expected to take effect some time during the summer of 1975. (40 Fed.
Reg. 4428) (1975). The amended regulations would expressly apply to Indian lands. Pro-
posed Regulation 30 C.F.R. § 211.1(a).
Oil and gas operations are controlled by 30 C.F.R. Part 221 (1974) which makes
express mention of Indian lands. 30 C.F.R. 9§ 221.2(d), 221.41 (1974).
198. 25 C.F.R. Part 177 (1975).
199. 25 C.P.R. §§ 171.2, 171.3, 171.3a, 172.4 (1975).
200. 25 C.F.R. §§ 171.4, 171.5, 172.3, 172.7, 172.8 (1975).
201. 25 C.F.R. §§ 171.10, 172.12 (1975).
202. 25 C.F.R. §§ 171.20, 171.21, 172.24 (1975).
203. 30 C.F.R. Part 221 (1974).
204. 30 C.F.R. § 221.2(d) (1974).
205. 30 C.F.R. § 221.2(c) (1974).
206. 30 C.F.R. §§ 211.3(a), 2 2 1.3a (1974).
207. 30 C.F.R. § 211.2 (1974).
208. 30 C.F.R. §§ 211.5, 211.6 (1974).
209. 90 C.F.R. §§ 211.19, 211.20 (1974).
210. See, for example, 30 C.F.R. § 211.21, 211.24, 211.27, 211.50 (1974).
211. 30 C.F.R. § 211.4(g) (1974), requiring that orders to ensure compliance with rules
and regulations do not conflict with state laws; 30 C.F.R. § 211.8 (1974), permitting use
of copies of accident reports to the state to be utilized; and 30 C.F.R. § 211.48(b) (1974),
in effect adopting by reference state requirements on the maximum crosscut or break-
through intervals. Such references do not appear to limit the Suprvisor's authority to fully
regulate and control such coal mining operations except in the two particulars noted per-
taining to enforcement orders and maximum crosscut intervals.
212. 40 Fed. Reg. 4428 (1974). Such regulations will hereinafter be referred to as "Pro.
posed Regulations."
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orderly and efficient prospecting, exploration, testing, devel-
opment, mining, preparation and handling operations and pro-
duction practices, without avoidable waste or loss of coal or
other mineral deposits or damage to coal or other mineral
bearing formation; to encourage maximum recovery and use
of coal resources; to promote operating practices which will
avoid, minimize or correct damage to the environment-land,
water and air-and avoid, minimize or correct hazards to pu-
blic health and safety; to require effective reclamation of
lands; and to obtain a proper record and accounting of all
coal produced. 213
Consistent with such statement of purpose, the proposed regula-
tions provide for a variety of control procedures, including plan ap-
provals, 214 and impose on lessees a wide range of operating require-
ments and restrictions2 15 all designed to:
[A]void, minimize or control soil erosion; pollution of air;
pollution of surface or ground water; serious alteration of
the normal flow of water; damage to vegetative growth, crops
or timber; injury or destruction of fish and wild life and
their habitat; creation of unsafe or hazardous conditions; dam-
age to improvements . . . ; and damage to recreational,
scenic, historical, archaeological and ecological values of the
land.216
Finally, the regulations at 25 C.F.R. Part 177 (1975) establish
a regulatory scheme involving the technical examination of lands
upon which operations are contemplated and the preparation, re-
view, approval and enforcement of operation plans to prevent dam-
age to the environment and to avoid, minimize or correct hazards
to the public health and safety.21 7
In summary, such statutes, and more particulary the regulations
issued thereunder, cover "in the most minute fashion ' 21 8 issuance
of mineral leases on Indian reservations and the conduct of opera-
tions thereunder. Such comprehensive regulatory scheme, together
with the even more detailed proposed regulations, provides a com-
pelling basis for the conclusion that the federal government has en-
tirely occupied the field, particularly with respect to operating, re-
clamation and pollution control matters. Accordingly, on the basis
of the Warren Trading Post decision, as a general proposition state
213. Proposed Regulations at 4430, 30 C.F.R. § 211.1(b).
214. Proposed Regulations at 4432-34, 30 C.F.R. § 211.10.
215. See, for example, Proposed Regulations at 4432, 94, 35, 30 C.F.R. §§ 211.4, 211.21,
211.37.
216. Id. at § 211.4(c).
217. 25 C.F.R. § 177.1 (1975). The regulations do not apply to oil and gas operations on
lands in which ownership of the surface and mineral estate has been severed. 25 C.F.R.
§ 177.2(b) (1975).
218. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n., 380 U.S. 685, 689 (1965).
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statutes relating to such matters should not be applicable to activi-
ties of non-Indian lessees on reservations.
In only one known instance has a court considered the extent of
a state's jurisdiction over mineral activities on an Indian reserva-
tion in light of such federal statutes and regulations. In Assiniboine
and Sioux Tribes v. Calvert Exploration Co. 219 the Tribes were suc-
cessful in preventing a non-Indian operator from pooling Indian lands
with non-Indian lands pursuant to an order of the Montana Oil and
Gas Conservation Commission. The Court reviewed the relevant fed-
eral statute 220 and regulations2 21 pertaining to formation of such units
and concluded that the state was without jurisdiction, holding:
It seems clear from these regulations that with respect to
restricted Indian lands the approval of well spacing programs
by the supervisor as the representative of the Secretary of
the Interior is required. To argue that Congress has left to
the states the determination of conservation practices, and
particularly well spacing requirements, is to disregard the
plain meaning of the regulations .222
VI. INFRINGEMENT UPON THE RIGHTS OF THE TRIBE TO
MAKE ITS OWN LAWS AND BE RULED BY THEM
If treaties and federal statutes neither grant nor deny the juris-
dictional authority which the state seeks to exercise, the final con-
sideration is whether the state's exercise of such jurisdiction will
interfere with the rights of the tribe to make its own laws and be
governed by them.
Tribal rights of self-government are founded on the Worcester v.
Georgia tribal sovereignty concepts and well illustrated in the analy-
sis from Federal Indian Law set forth above describing the manner
in which tribes retained such authority despite their treaty making
with the United States. 223 Such rights are also sometimes found by
expression, but more often by implication in the language of trea-
ties.2 2
Such rights also find strong recognition in federal statutes. The
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934225 specifically provided for the en-
219. Assinibolne and Sioux Tribes v. Calvert Exploration Co., 223 F. Supp. 909 (D.C.
Mont. 1963) rev'd sub nom. Yoder v. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes, 339 F.2d 360 (9th Cir.
1964). The reversal on appeal related to a failure of the plaintiff Tribes to show a juris-
dictional amount in controversy and was unrelated to the state-tribal jurisdiction Issue.
220. 25 U.S.C. § 396d (1970).
221. 30 C.F.R. §§ 221.2, 221.11 (1974).
222. 223 F. Supp. at 913.
223. Supra at note 32. A recent expression of the inherent nature of such powers of self-
government can be found in Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1965) at 376:
It is also true that an Indian tribe has the power, absent some treaty provi-
sion or act of congress to the contrary, to enact its own laws for the govern-
ment of its people, and to establish courts to enforce them.
224. See, for example, the interpretation of the language in the Navajo Treaty to that
effect in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973) and
In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 17, 220-221 (1959).
225. Act of JTune 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984.
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hancement of tribal self-governmental activities.228 It authorized tri-
bal organization for the common welfare and adoption of tri-
bal constitutions and bylaws. 227 Tribes were also directed to include
in their constitutions provisions preventing sale, lease or encum-
brance of tribal lands without the consent of the tribe.28 Alterna-
tively tribes were authorized to adopt charters and eventually to
thereby acquire greater control over tribal assets.229 Even the Indian
Civil Rights Act, 23 0 adopted by Congress to enhance civil liberties of
individual Indians by imposing certain due process restrictions on
Indian governments, has been interpreted as being consistent with
the recognized federal objective of preserving Indian tribes as self-
governing autonomous units. 23 1
Recall that the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee concluded that
although the basic sovereignty principles announced in Worcester v.
Georgia remained in effect, subsequent decisions indicated that those
principles had been modified and states had been allowed to exercise
jurisdiction "in cases where essential tribal relations were not involv-
ed and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized.... -22
The Court summarized the conclusions it drew from such cases in lan-
guage which provides the foundation for the test proposed in this
inquiry:
Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the question
has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them. 213
Utilizing that approach and finding no governing Acts of Congress,
the Court held that in view of a functioning tribal court system which
had jurisdiction over the controversy, to permit the state court sys-
tem to exercise jurisdiction would undermine the authority of the
tribal court system and "infringe on the rights of the Indians to
govern themselves.''2 34
Although the "infringement" portion of the Williams analysis
is easily stated it can be exceedingly difficult to apply in various
226. Id. §§ 16, 17 at 987.
227. Section 16 was codified at 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970).
228. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970) provides in part:
In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by exist-
ing law, the constitution adopted by said tribe shall also vest In such tribe
or its tribal council the following rights and powers: . . . to prevent the sale,
disposition, lease or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other
tribal assets without the consent of the tribe....
229. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1970).
280. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (Supp. 1975).
231. See generally, Note, "The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of
Tribal Governments," 82 Harv. L. Rev. 1343, 1359-60 (1969).
232. 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959).
233. Id. at 220.
234. Id. at 223.
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fact situations, and there remain a number of uncertainties about
its parameters. Some of these uncertainties have been commented
upon or dealt with in ensuing federal decisions.
First, in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,235 al-
though the case did not involve non-Indians, and although the opin-
ion specifically indicated that the Williams infringement analysis
was meant to be applied in situations involving non-Indians, 23 6 the
Court nevertheless commented that the impact of the purported
exercise of jurisdiction on individual Indians affected the tribe as a
whole and could constitute impermissible "infringement.
'237
Second, federal decisions indicate that for infringement to occur,
the tribe must be actively excercising the self-governmental right,
rather than merely having the potential for exercising such right.
Thus in Williams v. Lee 231 and in Littell v. Nakai239 active tribal
courts were operating which, by their own enabling ordinances,
had jurisdiction over the parties and the matter in controversy. In
Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle24° the Court expressly applied the
infringement portion of the Williams analysis and concluded, in the
face of a tribal resolution and existing procedures on extradition,
that to allow Arizona to assume the power to control extradition
matters would infringe on the tribe's rights of self-government.
24 1
Third, such decisions have begun to provide some guidance on
the exceedingly difficult fact question of what level of state presence
constitutes interference. In Williams, Littell v. Nakai and Arizona
ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, noted above, the Courts permitted no exer-
cise of state jurisdiction. In each of such cases an individual Indian
was involved and the purported state exercise of jurisdiction was in
direct conflict with tribal exercise of jurisdiction. However, in Nor-
vell v. Sangre de Cristo Development Co.,2 42 notwithstanding tribal
ordinances establishing subdivision regulations and building, plumb-
ing and electrical codes, the state was permitted to apply its land
subdivision act and construction licensing act to non-Indian develo-
235. 411 U.S. 164 (1978).
236. Id. at 179.
237. Id. at 181.
238. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
239. 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Blackfeet Tribal Court, 244
F. Supp. 474 (D. Mont. 1965).
240. 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
241. Id. at 686. A related series of decisions has concluded that litigants (Indian and
non-Indian) must exhaust their tribal remedies before turning to non-Indian courts for
assistance. See, for example, O'Neal v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 482 F.2d 1140 (8th
Cir. 1973) ; White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973) ; McCurdy v. Steele,
506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974) and Dodge v. Nakal, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
242. 372 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.M. 1974) ; reversed 519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975). It should
be noted that the District Court reached the infringement issue only after concluding that
the applicable federal statute (25 U.S.C. § 415), did not preempt the area of such regula-
tion at the time the lease was issued, and that a subsequent amendment to the statute
giving the Secretary of the Interior control over matters which the State sought to regulate
was not effective as to the lessees involved in the case.
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pers operating under a 99 year lease from the tribe. The court con-
cluded on the facts that application of the state istatutes would have
little if any impact on the Indians themselves, although the opinion
does not indicate to what extent the state acts and tribal ordi-
nances may have been in conflict. In summary, these cases seem to
say that where there is actual conflict and an Indian is involved,
there is infringement. However, where no Indian is directly involved,
and where the state exercise of jurisdiction has no impact on the
Indians, Norvell may be saying that joint regulation of the non-
Indian's conduct by state and tribe is permissible, at least to the ex-
tent that such regulations do not directly conflict.
Considering these principles, there is considerable potential for
state infringement on tribal self-government in connection with state
regulation of non-Indian mineral operators. Indian tribes are actively
and increasingly involved in control of on-reservation mineral acti-
vities. For example, provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act
authorize tribal control over the granting of mineral leases. 243 Federal
Regulations confirm and elaborate on that authority. 2 4 In respect
to coal leasing and operations, the Secretary of the Interior has de-
termined that all future operations on the Northern Cheyenne Reser-
vation will only be carried out pursuant to mining plans approved
by the Tribe. 245 This approach will probably be followed in large
scale mineral development operations on other reservations. A Con-
gressional intent to enhance tribal participation in control of coal
surface mining operations is apparent in the recently vetoed Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1975246 where tribes were
authorized to impose more stringent standards. 24 7 It would not be
unreasonable to anticipate that such attitude will manifest itself in
future Congressional action concerning Indian tribes.
In summary, there is substantial tribal involvement in respect to
regulation and control of mineral activities on Indian reservations.
It can be expected to increase, both by reason of federal statutes
and regulations and by reason of independent assertions of such au-
thority by individual Indian tribes as their awareness of the need and
potential for such involvement increases. The present level of activi-
ty, together with the expectation for future tribal involvement to an
even greater degree, creates the potential for impermissible infringe-
ment on Indian rights of self-government each time a state attempts
to apply its jurisdiction to on-reservation mineral operations. But the
determination whether such infringement has actually occurred will
243. 25 U.S.C. §§ 476, 477 (1970).
244. See, for example, 25 C.F.R. § 17.2 (1975).
245. Decision of the Secretary of the Interior in Response to Petition of the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe, June 4, 1974.
246. H.R. 25, 94th Cong., lst Sess. (1975).
247. Id. at Section 710.
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have to be made on a case by case basis, considering the specific
state statute involved and the degree and nature of tribal govern-
mental activity.

